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veryclearly defined, an inconvenience which must attend every
doctrine, which is not founded on logical principles. Modern
conveyances of fee simple estates,especially in cities, are often
burdened with restrictions against the exercise of certain trades
and occupations upon the premises, as well as covenants and
conditions relating to the improvement of the property; as f6r
instance that the dwellings shall be of certain dimensions and
material, and be located a certain distance from the street.
To what extent and within what bounds these restrictions
may be enforced is a subject upon which a lawyer cannot
advise with much confidence or satisfaction. A full consideration of them is not within the scope of our discussion. A. M.
(To be continued.)
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Supreme Court of California.
GALLAND V. GALLAND.
A court of equity has jurisdiction to decree alimony to a wife on petition,
though no divorce is asked.
A statute authorizing the courts ot a State to grant alimony in suits for
divorce does not thereby prohibit the granting of alimony in other cases.

THIs was an action by a wife against her husband for permanent alimony. The substance of the complaint was as follows: That plaintiff and defendant b3came husband and wife
in the kingdom of Prussia in the year 1859, and immediately
removed to California, from which time they continued to
live together as man and wife till November, 1864, and by their
united exertions acquired property of the value of twenty thousand dollars, which property consisting of money, stocks, notes
and other personal securities, was entirely in the hands and
under the control of defendant; that in the month of November,
18641, defendant, without cause, drove plaintiff from his house
and ever since has refused to allow her to return; that since
the separation, as aforesaid, the defendant has supplied her
with $77 per month for the maintenance of herself and child,
but threatens to reduce or wholly deprive her of this allowance
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at his pleasure; that she has no separate property. Where.
fore plaintiff prays permanent alimony in the sum of $150 per
month, to be paid and secured to her for the separate mainte.
nance of herself and child. To this complaint defendant demurred.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CRocKETT, J.-The question presented on this appeal is,
whether or not a wife who, without cause or provocation, is
driven from her husband's house with her infant child, and is
wholly without the means of support, can maintain an action
against the husband for a reasonable allowance for the maintenance of herself and child, unless she couples with the application a prayer for a divorce.
In the early days of English jurisprudence the rights of the
wife, as against the husband or his estate, were extremely
limited. The theory was, that her separate entity was merged
in his; that she was to be so completely under his dominion
and control as to entitle him to administer reasonable personal
chastisement for her offenses; that she had no control over his
estate, and could maintain no action against him for any cause
whatsoever. A system so utterly inconsistent with a just and
enlightened view of the marriage relation could not long withstand the advancing march of civilization. Gradually, but
steadily, these stringent rules were relaxed in favor of the wife,
until finally marriage came to be regarded in law as simply a
civil contract between persons capable of contracting, and in
which the parties were reciprocally entitled to certain reasonable rights which the law would protect. Amongst other rights
secured to the wife is the right to be suitably supported and
maintained by the husband, according to his means and station.
If he fails or refuses to provide such support-for her, the law
authorizes her to purchase from others, on the credit of her
husband, whatever is necessary for her maintenance and suitable to her station in life. There can be no diversity of opinion on this point, which is thoroughly well settled. But is this
the only remedy for a deserted and dependent wife, who either
has no subsisting cause for divorce, or who, having just grounds
for dissolving the marriage, hopes for a reformation in her hus-
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band, and therefore does not desire a divorce? The purchming from other.i, on the husband's credit, the necessaries for her
support, affords at best a most humiliating, unreliable and pre.
carious means of subsistence. If the credit and pecuniary responsibility of the husband be unquestionable, the tradesman
dealing with the wife takes the risk, whether the articles furnished are really necessaries suitable to her condition, and he
sells to her in view of a strong probability that his demand may
be disputed by the husband and will not be paid except after
an expensive litigation. But he may be wholly ignorant of the
11usband's pecuniary condition, or the husband, though rich,
may have no visible, tangible property subject to be seized in
execution, and in all or either of these contingencies, it is evident the wife of a wealthy husband might starve for lack of the
necessaries of life, because of her inability to procure them on
the husband's credit. If this resource fail her, how is she to
obtain relief, if she either has no grounds for divorce or does
not desire a divorce? Is the law so deplorably deficient as to
afford no remedy to a deserted and starving wife under these
circumstances? If so, it is a reproach to the civilization of the
age, and the law-making power should promptly correct the
evil. But the law, in my opinion, is not amenable to this re
proach and affords an appropriate remedy. The statute of
this State regulating divorce and alimony entitles the wife to a
divorce if the husband has deserted her for two years; and on
filing her complaint, the court is authorized to grant her alimony, pendente lite, and permanent alimony if she obtains the
divorce. But there is no provision of the statute which authorizes an application for alimony, except in connection with a
prayer for divorce; and it is claimed on behalf of the defendant that, inasmuch as provision is made for allowance of alimony only on an application for divorce, it was the intention
of the legislature to limit the power of the court to grant alimony to that class of cases. The maxim, " Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius" is invoked as applicable to this proposition.
But, in my opinion, it has no application to the case. The main
subject-matter of the statute was the regulation of divorce;
and only as incidental to that subject the statute prescribes the
30
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power of the court in respect to alimony in that class of cases.
The legislature was not dealing with the general subject of alimony as an independent subject-matter of legislation, but only
as one of the incidents of an application for divorce. It saw
fit to define the power of the court over the allowance of alimony on an application for divorce, but was not considering
the subject of alimony in any other class of cases. If it had
provided that a writ of ne exeat or distringas might issue
against a a defendant in an action for divorce, it would scarcely
be claimed by any one that this was equivalent to a declaration
that such writs should not issue in any other class of actions.
For the same reason, a provision for alimony in a suit for divorce is not to be considered as a declaration that alimony
shall not be allowed in other actions. . The maxim which is
invoked has no application to this class of cases.
If alimony can be granted without an application for divorce,
it can only be because it comes within the general powers of a
court of equity, independently of the statute. In England the
decisions on this point have been by no means uniform. In
some the power has been maintained by eminent judges; in
others it has been doubted; and in a few it has been denied.
In America there has been a similar diversity of opinion. The
power of a court of equity to decree alimony, where no other
relief was asked, has been upheld in well considered cases by
the Supreme Courts of Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Alabama. In Butler v. Butler, 4 Littell
202, the question was elaborately reviewed by Judge MILLS,
one of the most eminent jurists of that State, and his reasoning
is so convincing as to commend itself to every impartial mind.
Re says. "Suppose the case of abandonment by a husband,
and that the separation is complete without any sentence, and
thatthe wife is left to the humanity of the world, without support, has the chancellor without the statute, or in cases not embraced by it, no authority to direct a portion of the husband's
estate to be set apart for the support of the wife, leaving the
marriage contract as obligatory as ever? This is a question
different from the power of separation, and deserves separate
consideration. It is true, that the Courts of Chancery would
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always grant this, after the spiritual court had acted as to the
separation, and before. when there had been an agreement (to
separate); but without such previous sentence or agreement,
could it never interfere ? On this point the English authorities
are contradictory and indeed somewhat irreconcilable. Cases
during the usurpation went that far; but in answer to that it
is said that the jurisdiction was expressly given and that such
doubts afterward existed of the validity of these decrees that
they were confirmed by Parliament.

*

*

"Besides in the cases of Lashbrook v. Tyler, 1 Ch. R.24;
Williams v. Callow, 2 Vern. 752; Watkins v. Watlkins, 2
Atkyn 97; alimony was decreed where there appears no sentence of separation or agreement, and in at least two of these
cases it certainly appears there was neither. In some other
cases, where the existence of an agreement was relied on, the
court only used it as a pretext for jurisdiction, and did not,
confine itself to the terms of the agreement, but departed from
it in making such allowance as was equitable. Between such
conflicting authorities we consider ourselves at liberty to choose
and decide according to the principles of equity and reason of
the case. It is clear that strong moral obligations must lie on
any husband who has abandoned his wife, to support her. The
marriage contract and every principle bind him to this. To
fail to do it is a wrong acknowledged at common law, though
that law knows no remedy, because the wife cannot sue the
husband, and it is the province of a court of equity to afford a
remedy, where conscience and law acknowledged a right, but
know no remedy. Why, then, should the chancellor shrink at
this case and refuse a remedy? It is evident that this arose
in England, for fear of intruding upon the ground occupied by
the ecclesiastical courts. These courts were incorporated with
their government, and as much compossd a part of the civil
organization of that country as our county courts do here; and
their senteilce on -subjects within their jurisdiction was as
obligatory and as much noticed in their civil courts as the decisions of other courts. And, indeed, they kept and held juris.
diction of some matters strictly temporal. It became neces.
sary to draw the line of demarcation around them and restraix
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other tribunals from occupying the same ground and to refuse
to entertain concurrent jurisdiction, leaving the party to apply there for his or her remedy.
"But in this country we have no such courts or boundaries
around them to notice. The reason, then, for refusing thejurisdiction of such cases as are peculiarly temporal, and especially
this case, which lies within the compass of the general grant to
the chancellor, has here ceased and does not exist. And
grievous wrongs might exist without remedy untilthe legislature interfered, which is against a well-known principle ripened
into a maxim. Indeed, probable cases might be supposed and
known where, in one year, absolute starvation might be the
consequence of the abandonment and withdrawing the means
of support, if the chancellor has no power to interpose. We,
therefore conceive that the chancellor, before the statute, and
since in cases not embraced by it, which have strong moral
claims, had and has jurisdiction to decree alimony, leaving
the matrimonial chain untouched and that these authorities
which decide in favor of such jurisdiction ought to prevail."
I can add nothing to the cogency of this reasoning, which
appears to me to admit of no satisfactory answer.
The same proposition is maintained in Purcell v. Purcell,4
Hen. & Mun. 507; Almond v. Almond, 4 Randolph 662; Logan
v. Logan, 2 B. Mon. 142; Pratherv. Prather, Desaus 33;
Rhame v. Rhame, I McOord Oh. R. 197; Glover v. Glover,
16 Ala. 446.
It has been the constant practice of courts of equity not only
to enforce agreements for a separation and a separate mainte.
nance of the wife, where a divorce was not asked for or decreed,
but in such cases, as remarked by Judge MiLLs, in Butler v.
Butler, supra, "where the existence of an agreement (to separate) was relied on, the court only used it as a pretext for jurisdiction, and did not confine itself to the terms of the agreement,
but departed from it in making such allowance as was equitable2' If the court would entertain jurisdiction to enforce an
agreement for separation, and then felt itself at liberty to depart
from the terms of the agreement, in awarding an allowance to
the wife, it is difficult to discern, on any principle of reason or
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justice, why it should refuse to take jurisdiction when the
husband simply turns his wife out of doors, without cause,
and refuses to support her. I do not perceive on what grounds
a wife who agrees to separate from her husband should stand
on a more favored footing than one who clings to him, in despite of his ill usage, until she is driven from his home and
forbidden thereafter to speak to him. It is better, in my
opinion, to abandon the subterfuge to which courts have sometimes resorted in such cases, "as a pretext for jurisdiction,"
and administer the appropriate relief without the "pretext."
At common law the wife had no interest, except her right of
dower, in the estate of her husband, acquired either before or
after the marriage. The right of dower depended on the fact
whether or not she survived her husband. Even her own
estate, unless settled to her sole use, became, to a great degree,
merged in his. But under the laws of this State, the wife not
only retains her separate property, but that which is earned
during the marriage becomes the common property of the husband and wife; and though it is subject to his control, as the
head of the family, whilst the marriage continues, yet, if, the
wife survives him, or if the marriage relation be dissolved by a
decree of the court, except for the adultery or extreme cruelty
of the wife, she is entitled to one-half of the common property
then remaining. The theory on which this right is founded is,
that the common property was acquired by the joint efforts of
the husband and wife, and should be divided between them, if
the marriage tie is dissolved either by the death of the husband
or by the decree of the court, unless the wife shall have forfeited
her right by committing an act of adultery or extreme cruelty;
and even then, the court pronouncing the decree is authorized
to apportion the property at its discretion. With these liberal
provisions for the wife, who has a joint and equal interest with
the husband in all property acquired during the marriage, it
would present an anomaly in jurisprudence, if the husband,
without cause, could drive his wife from his house, without any
provision for her support, and appropriate the entire common
property and its income to his own use, whilst the courts
would be powerless to compel him to set apart a portion of the
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property for her support, unless she coupled with her applica.
tion a prayer for a divorce; and if she had no lawful ground
for a divorce, or was unwilling to assert it, she would remain
utterly without redress from the courts, and might starve for
lack of the necessaries of life, unless she could persuade
some reluctant tradesman to furnish them on the credit of
her husband. Whatever reason may have prevailed at common law to induce the courts to withhold their aid from the
wife, under these circumstances, none exists in this State why
a court of equity should refuse to compel an offending husband to provide out of their common property for the support of an ill-used wife, who has been forced to seek protection elsewhere than under her husband's roof.
It is urged, however, in argument, that if this be our ruling, it will tend to breed discord in families and to encourage
discontented.wives to abandon their husbands on frivolous
pretexts of ill-usage, relying on the courts to compel the
husbands to support them. On the other hand, however, it
might be urged with even more force, that if such redress
be denied to the wife in proper cases, dissolute and unprincipled husbands would be encouraged to abuse their wives
by a consciousness that any ill-treatment which stopped short
of a lawful ground for divorce was without redress in the
courts. The courts must deal with human nature as they
find it; and no system of jurisprudence can be so adminis.
tered as to avoid possible abuses in exceptional cases.
On the whole case, I. think the demurrer to the complaint
was properly overruled, and that the judgment ought to be
affirmed, and it is so ordered.
SAWRy,
C. J., and RHODES, J., concurred.
SPRAGUE, J., dissenting.-At common law a wife cannot
maintain an action against her husband for any purpose, under any circumstances, and if the present action can be maintained, it must find its warrant in our State legislation, or
within the comprehensive but well defined original equitable
jurisdiction of our courts.
The facts alleged in the complaint manifestly do not place
the plaintiffwithin the direct provisions of any statute of this
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State authorizing an action to be maintained by a wife alone;
or against her husband for any purpose; no fact or facts are
alleged constituting a ground for divorce, nor does the action
-concern her separate property, nor her right or claim to hometead property. And in considering the question with referense to the right of the wife, to maintain this action for the
relief sought by virtue of the original equity powers and jurisdiction of our district courts, the question naturally suggests
itself, whether the statute of the State concerning divorce,
which provides for temporary and permanent alimony, in connection with and based upon an action or final decrce for
divorce, does not, by necessary implication, exclude and deny
a right of action for alimony, disconnected with and indepen.
dent of an action for or a final decree of divorce. In other
words, whether the power conferred upon the court by the
statute, to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife,
pending an action for or after final decree of divorce, does not
by necessary implication negative the power or jurisdiction of
the court to decree an allowance for the separate maintenance
of the wife, dxcept when jurisdiction is acquired by the commencement of an action for divorce, upon allegations of statutory cause therefor.
The fourth section of the Act concerning divorces (statutes
of 1851, p. 186), enumerates and defines the causes for which
our district courts are authorized to grant divorces "from bed
and board or from the bonds of matrimony," and section 7 of
the same Act provides that "in any sectionfor divorce the court
may, during the pendency of the action, or at the final hearing
or afterward, make such order for the support of the wife and
the maintenance and education of the children of the marriage
as inay be just, and may, at any time thereafter, annul, vary
or modify such order, as the interest and welfare of the chil.iren may require" This statute, in my judgment, by neces.
.,ary implicatim, fixes and determines the basis of the right
of the wife toclaim an allowance for her separate maintenance,
as against her husband, limits and restricts the power and
jurisdiction of the court to grant such allowance to the wife,
subordinates such power andj urisdiction to an antecedent juris-
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diction of the court acquired and entertained in the statutory
actions for divorce, and renders the right of the wife to claim
alimony, and the power of the court to order and decree the
same, dependent upon and incidental or auxiliary to an action
pending for divorce or final decree in such action.
The power and jurisdiction of the court to grant temporary
or permanent alimony is directly conferred, pending, or on, or
after final decree in an action for divorce, and, by necessary
implication, is denied or withheld, as an original, independent
jurisdiction or power upon the well-established principles of
construction ofstatutes, exsressio uniusest exclusio alleris.And

this would seem to be conclusive alike upon the common law,
andequjty powers of our courts, and must control, notwithstanding the apparent hardship in exceptional cases, until the, legislature may deem it expedient to recognize a right in the
wife to demand an allowance from the husband for her separate maintenance, under prescribed circumstances, without
referefice to a legal separation, and provide a mode for the
enforcement of such right.
It is very clear that the claim attempted to be enforced by
this action has no common law existence as a separate, indepen.
dent right, and the statutes of our State having failed to recognize or confer such right, except as incidental to and dependent
upon a proceedhig for divorce, thereby, by necessary implica.
tion, denying the existence of the same as a substantive, legal
or equitable entity, capable of invoking the aid of our courts
for its recognition and enforcement, it follows that the first
point raised by the demurrer to the complaint is well taken,
and the court, in my judgment, erred in overruling the same.
With these views it becomes unnecessary to indicate an opinion upon the question as to the original inherent jurisdiction
and power of a court of chancery over the independent subjectmatter of alimony or separate maintenance to the wife, in the
absence of legislative enactments, but the very able and plausible argument of counsel for respondent has prompted a very
thorough investigation of all the authorities referred to by
connsel, and all within the reach of this court, and, after such
investigation, I am entirely satisfied, upon reason and largely
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preponderant authority of both English and American chancery courts, that the subject-matter of allowance for separate
maintenance or alimony to the wife, as an independent matter
is not within the general original jurisdiction of courts of equity
and such jurisdiction is only exercised in reference thereto as
derivative and incidental to some other primary, original, substantive matter, to which their jurisdiction had attached, or
subject to their specialcontrol. Says Mr. Olancy: "These courts
have no jurisdiction to decree such a provision to the wife
inerely because her husband has deserted her, or because she
finds it necessary for her safety to remove herself from his
power, unless she has also property over which they have control. Such a jurisdiction belongs to the spiritual courts only,
and even its authority arises but incidentally from the power
it has of decreeing separation a mensa et thoro, when the wife
libels her husband, on account of desertion or cruelty, and
seeks the consequent relief:" Olancy on Married Women, chap.
9, p. 549. And Mr. Bishop, after giving the definition of the
term alimony as "the allowance which the husband, by order
of court, pays to his wife living separate from him, for her
maintenance," says: "The allowance may be for her use either
during the pendency of a suit, in which case it is called alimony
pendnte lite, or after its termination, called permanent alimony. It has no common law existence as a separate, independent right; but wherever found, it comes as an incident to
a proceeding for some other purpose, as for a divorce-no court
in England having any jurisdiction to grant it where it is the
only relief sought": 2 Bishop on Mar. and Div., 4th edition,
see. 351, 549. Again, after a very general citation and review
of English and American authorities, the reasons and foundations for the rule, as above stated, are briefly presented in section 374 (561) as follows: "As a general proposition a decree
for separation in favor of the wife must be attended, if she asks
for it, by a decree for alimony. And upon the same principle
rests the better and general doctrine already discussed, ti at no
court can grant alimony when it is the only thing sought,
because, in the nature of the case, an adjudication allowing the
wife to live separate from the husband is a necessary founda
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tion for an adjudication compelling him to pay her a separate
support. His ordinary duty is to maintain her in cohabitation
with him, not otherwise, and the court cannot adjudge him
obligated to do it in separation until it adjudges that she may
live separate. *

*

* Upon the same principle rests the legal

liability of the husband to pay any third person for necessaries
which himself has refused to provide; but here, as the wife is
not a party to the suit, the adjudication can extend no further
than to control the particular case. * * * In short, the
doctrine extends through the entire field of our law as administered alike in the common law, equity and ecclesiastical tribunals, that, in effect, whenever the wife is adjudged entitled
to live separate from her husband by reason of breaches of
matrimonial duty committed by him, a concurring adjudication
must be pronounced that he support her while so living; the
one adjudication being commensurate in extent with the other,
and neither one existing without the other:" See also, 2 Story's
Eq. Jur., Sees. 1422, 1424; Fonbl. Eq., B. 1, Oh. 2, See. 6,
Notes n. n.,; Fischle v. Fische, 1 Blackf. 365; Chapman v.
Capman, 13 Ind. 397; Shannon v. Shannon, 2 Gray 285;
Shafe v. Shafe, 4 Foster 567; Parsons-i.
Parsons, 9 N. H.
809; Lawson v. Shotwel, 27 Miss. 633; Doyle v. Doyle, 26
Mo. 549; Yule v. Yule, 2 Stock. 143; Covey v. Covey, 3 Id.
400; McGee v. McGee, 10 Ga. 482; Peltier v. Peltier, Har-

ring, Mich., Oh. R 29.
In several States, by legislative enactment, proceedings for
obtaining an allowance for the separate maintenance of the
wife disconnected with proceedings for or a decree of divorce
are authorized.
In Maryland, courts of chancery exercise jurisdiction to
grant alimony to the wife, but only upon allegation of facts
which would be a sufficient foundation in England for granting
a divorce a mensa et thoro: Willingford v. Willingford,'6 Har.

& J. 485; Helens Franciscus,2 Bland Ch. R.568; and New
York follows the procedure of the English courts: 2 John
Ch. R, 206; 5 Id. 464; 3 Oowan 590; 6 John., Oh. R. 25,
178; 4 Paige, Oh. R.74.
It is clearly the duty and common law obligation of the hus.
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band to provide a suitable maintenance for his wife, if within
his power, during the existence of the marriage relation. Yet
courts of equity have original jurisdiction to enforce specific
performance of this obligation. "The proper remedy," says
Mr. Justice STORY, "When the husband abandons the wife,
or drives her from his house, and neglects or refuses to provide her suitable maintenance," is by an action in a court of
law to be brought against the husband by any person who
shall, under such circumstances, supply the wife with necessaries according to her rank and condition; for, by compelling the wife thus to leave him, the husband sends her abroad
with a general credit for her maintenance: 2 Story's Eq. Jur.
Sec. 1422. And I apprehend this is the only remedy against
the husband for the maintenance of the wife, in this State,
prior to the commencement of an action for divorce by either
husband or wife, upon allegation of statutory cause.
In the present case no statutory ground for divorce is alleged in the complaint. There is, therefore, no allegation of
facts sufficient to sustain the action, or authorize relief to any
extent in the direction prayed for.
For these reasons, I think the judgment should be reverised.
SANDERSO,

J., concurred in this opinion.

United States District Court, District of Rhode Island.
OOLOGAARDT V. THE BRIG ANNA.
Where a vessel is libeled and sold on a bottomry bond, the fund in court is
not subject, as against the bondholder, to any claim for a general average loss
subsequent to the date of the bond.
Whether the admirality has jurisdiction of a suit in rer, for a general aver.

age Ioss--qu-z

TmIs was a petition by T. & J. Coggeshall, of Newport,
against the proceeds of the sale of the brig, on account of general average expenses.
On the 24th of February, 1870, the firm of Oologaardt &
Bruinier, of Amsterdam, in the kingdom of the Netherlands,
exhibited in this court their libel against the brig Anna, of
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Maitland, Nova Scotia, Robert Dart master, -then lying in the
port of Providence in this district, articulately.propoundingi,
substance, that by virtue of a certain instrument of hypothecation and bottomry, made by said Dart, as master, on the
25th of November, 1869, in the parish of Helden, in the province of North Holland, in the kingdom of the Netherlands,
they were entitled to a decree of this court against the said
brig for the sum of $2,195.14 in gold-and praying piocess
in admiralty against said vessel, to compel or secure payment
of said sum, with incidental costs and charges.
A decree of sale was entered, without opposition, on the
2d of March, 1870, when, also, the claim of the lielants for
the sum aforesaid was ascertained and allowed, and on the
19th of March the net proceeds of the sale ($2,300, less $98.94,
costs of sale), $2,201.06, were lodged in the registry. Out of
this fund, the lielants assenting, on the 21st of Maioh were
paid to petitioning seamen and material men, the gross sum
of $159.42, leaving in the registry for the payment of taxa.
ble costs and the libelant's claim as aforesaid, the sum of $1,.
541.54. Out of this, the said Capt Dart, although a part
owner of the vessel, by petition, prayed payment of hi wages
in arrears, amounting to $270, grounding his claim upun section 52 of the statute 7 and 8 Victoria, and notice was given
to the court and the libelants that yet another claim upon the
fund, for the salvage or of the nature of a salvage claim, would
be preferred in the course of a few days.
On the 26th of March the petition of the captain was dismissed with costs, and in pursuance of notice aforesaid, the
petition of T. & J. Coggeshall, claiming payment of the sum of
$218.67, was filed.
Payne & Tobey, for petition.
Browne & Fan Slyck, for libelants.

KNowIES, D. J.-The claim is in the name of T. & J. Coggeshall, but it appears from the testimony that, as regards this
matter, we may view John Coggeshall as composing the firm.
He alone acted, spoke and wrote, and he alone testifies in support of his claim. In fact, the only evidence submitted in his
deposition with its exhibits A and B-the first a document
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entitled "General Average Statement, signed "Bradford &
Folger, Adjusters of M. Losses," the second an account of T. &
J. Coggeshall against the the "Brig Anna, of Maitland, N. S,
cargo and all concerined," amounting to $710.46, comprising
thirtv-five items-the largest of them $200, for their "services
and responsibility," the smallest -27cents for a telegram from
Capt. Dart to somebody not named. To this amount the adjusters add a charge of $50 for their services, one of $3 for
drawing a marine protest, and a third of $19.08 for commissions for collecting general average at 2J per cent, making
a gross sum of $782.51-of which amount the petitioners,
quoting as unimpeachable and unobjectionable, the adjusters'
itatement claim that $218.63 should be paid them out of
th eproceeds of the vessel in the registry; freight being
bound (as say the adjusters) to pay $105.63, and the owners
of the cargo, $458.28.
In support of this claim the petitioners first invite attention
to a paragraph (said but not proven to be an extract from the
brig's log-book) prefixed to the adjusters' statement, narrating
as facts the following, viz.: That the vessel sailed from Amsterdam, November 15,1869, with a cargo of scrap iron and empty
casks for Providence, R.I.; had severe weather all the voyage,
and on the 6tfl of December discovered a leak of three to four
nundred strokes per hour, requiring the use of one pump all
the time in bad weather; the jib stay sails and other sails split.
That on the 10th of February, the vessel arrived at Newport
and anchored off Rose Island between 1 and 2 P M., when after
furling sails, it was discovered that the vessel was leaking very
much more. That then, with four extra men from shore, commenced and continued pumping until 4 A. M., February l1th,
when the revenue cutter came alongside and towed the vessel
into the inner harbor about 3 A. M., when she grounded in 14
feet of water, having * feet of water in her hold; and that subsequently she was pumped out and towed to Providence (a
distance of thirty miles), with cargo on board.
Next in support of the claim, the deposition of John Coggeshall, the claimant, was read, of which the material portions
were these, viz.:
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He is 38 years of age, resides in -Newport, and is, and has
been for many years, the agent for the New York Board of
Underwriters. On the morning of the 11th of February, in
consequence of a message from the captain of the revenue cutter, he went on board the cutter, where he was informed that
the Anna was lying in the outer harbor in a leaky condition,
liable to sink; in view of which fact the captain of the cutter had
deemed it proper to notify the witness, as an agent of underwriters, who might be interested in the vessel or her cargo.
The result of the conference between the captain and the witness was, that some of the cutter's men were put on board the
brig, her anchor taken up, and she taken in tow by the cutter
and brought into the inner harbor of Newport, in shoal water.
Then says the witness : "I went on board the brig, and found
there part of the cutter's crew, and the mate of the brig Anna
and a portion of her crew. After that, by my advice, thebrig
was put in shoal water where she would ground at low tide,
extra men being put on board to pump. I then went on shore
and immediately telegraphed to the New York Board of Underwriters, receiving a reply from the Atlantic M. M. Insurance
Company of New York, that they had insured $1,000 on the
freight money of said brig from Amsterdam to Providence, and
asking me to protect their interest. Up to thii time I had not
seen the captain of the Anna, but had sent a messenger to him
on shore. I wished to learn who was the owner or consignee
of the cargo in Providence. The captain came to my offlee and
informed me that he did not know, as the cargo was consigned to order. I advised him to telegraph immediately to
some owner of his vessel or to some agent, advising him of the
condition of the vessel. He telegraphed to D'Wolf & Co., of
New York; and it happened that one part-owner of his vessel,
Mr. Crow, was in New York, who replied to Captain Dart's
telegram that he would be in Newport the following morning.
He came accordingly, and learned from the captain that a bottomry bond had been given upon the vessel at Amsterdam.
'Mr. Crow thought that the amount of the bond exceeded the
value of the vessel, and therefore would not take any responsibility or agree to pay any portion of the expenses of pumping
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the vesse or of towing her to Providence. I kept three
pumpers on board, by agreeing to pay their expenses. The
following morning I came to Providence, to find the consignee
of the cargo, and there learned that A. & V. Sprague were
expecting a cargo of iron from Europe. These gentlemen referred me to their agent, Mr. Greene, who declined to take
any responsibility because the cargo was to be delivered on
the wharf in Providence, he agreeing, however, that when the
cargo should be delivered he would sign a general average
bond, to pay a portion of the general average charges. I kept
the men pumping, and became responsible for all the bills, and
advised the captain to get the stern of the vessel out of water
as much as possible. The men carried some twenty-five tons
of iron forward by my and the captain's directions, which
brought the leak out of water enough, so that the vessel was
pumped out. I can't say whether this iron was carried forward
by the men I assured for their pay, or by the crew. Probably
both parties assisted. I don't say I sent these men on board.
I told Captain Dart to get all the men that were necessary,
and I assured him I would pay them. After the vessel was
pumped out so that the pumps sucked, I telegraphed to Providence for a steam tug, agreeing to be responsible for the bill.
I then, before the vessel started for Providence, had a survey
by three competent men, a ship-carpenter, a captain and a retired sail-maker, who approved of my plan to send the vessel
to Providence, by means of the tug-boat, with extra men to
pump, if necessary. The tug came down that night and took
the brig in tow about 4 o'clock next morning and delivered
her safely in Providence. Before she started for Newport, I
put on board of the brig a watchmen at the instigation of the
holder of the bottomry bond (a Mr. Blake), and also two or
three men to pump. The watchman was to see that nothing
was taken from the vessel. After the vessel was delivered in
Providence A. & W. Sprague signed the average bond, and
my action was approved by, them, the insurers on the freight
Captain Dart and Mr. Crow." The witness further stated thAt
he believed the vessel arrived in Providence the 17th of February, and that he had procured the average statement to be
made up by Messrs. Bradford & Folger.
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Upon this state of facts and proof the petitioners rest their
claim--ccmtending that under the law as it is, or as it
should be declared, the expenses incurred and the services
rendered by them are general average expenses, and that the
fund in the registry is bound to contribute ratably to such
general average expenses.
On behalf of the libelants it is averred and maintained-First-That no claim upon a general average lies against
the bottomry bondholder, whether regard be had to the principles involved in the contract of bottomry, or to the recordea
adjudications of the admirality courts of England or the
United States.
Second-That the facts in proof in this case show no occasion
or justification for an assessment by general average for the
expenses incident to the springing a leak of the brig Anna. In
a word, that had the petitioners (virtually but volunteers, or
at most, but very active agents of the insurers of the freight).
kept aloof, the captain and the crew of the brig would have
brought her to Providence quite as soon, and in quite as good
a condition as she was brought by the petitioner's aid.
Third-That by the law of Holland, the locus contractus, a
bottomry bondholder is exempt from a general average.
Fourth-That divers of the charges comprised in the statement of general average on file are either illegal or very exorbitant, and few, if any of them, supported by any proof whatever, one of said charges being for expenses and services of
Mr. Crow, an owner, to the amount of $40, and another of
$25 for Captain Dart's services and provisions, to specify no
otners.
To these positions of the parties respectively I have given
deliberate and prolonged consideration, and to the many authorities cited by them, as well as to scores of others not cited
at the bar, have given a not hurried examination. The conulusion to which I arrive is, that the petitioners' claim must
be disallowed.
Were the judgment of this court a final one-that is, not a
subject of review on appeal, I should deem it warrantable, if
not expedient, here to state in extenso my views of the several
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points presented, and the processes of reasoning, upon the
authorities examined and the facts in proo; which lead me
to the conclusion I have announced. But as an appeal lies
to the Circuit Court, and as it seems to me not improbable
that the petitioners may desire the judgment of that court
upon the principal question involved (now for the first time,
so far as I can learn, distinctly raised in a Federal court), I re
frain from saying anything in support or vindication of my
judgment. I have only to add, and this from abundant cau.
tion, that my ruling in this matter is not to be received or
represented as pro forma merely; on the contrary, it is the
result of deliberation and research.
It may not be unprofitable to add, that upon a question not
raised at the bar, viz.: Whether the admiralty has jurisdiction of a suit in rem for average contribution, the inquirer
may, with great advantage, consult 7 Howard 729; 2 Curtis
7; 19 Howard 171; 1 Sprague's Decisions 135 to 144; 8
Howard 615 (appendix), and 6 MciLean 576. As to this
point, I here express no opinion.
The petition is dismissed, with costs.

United ,States Dstrict Court, Districtof Wi8comin.
THE UNITED STATES V. ALPHONSO PRESCOTTP ET AL.

In an indictment under Sect. 44 of the Bankrupt AcM for fraudulently obtaining goods on credit, the proceedings in the Bankrupt Court must be
pleaded and proved with such particularity as to show affirmatively that an
adjudication of bankruptcy w~s made upon a case in which the court bad
jurisdiction.
The indictment therefore should set out the fling of the petition, the name
of the petitioning creditor, theamount of his debt, the alleged act of bankruptcy
and the adjudication of the Bankrupt Court.
The description of the goods obtained must be as certain as it can reasonably be made. It should be as definite as would be required in a declaration
in trover.
Offenses under Sect. 44 are misdemeanors, and the word" feloniously" should
not be used.
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TMiS was a motion to quah an indictment under Sec. 44 of
the Bankrupt Act, for fraudulently obtaining goods on credit
James G. Jenkins, for the motion.
Hazleton, District Attorney, contra.
MILLER, D. J.-The first count of the indictment charges

that on a certain day mentioned, in the District Court of the
United States, for the District of Wisconsin, under and pursuant to an Act of Congress, entitled "An Act to establish a
uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States,"
approved March 2, 1867, proceedings in bankruptcy were
duly coihmenced against Alphonso Prescott, Leander F. Snyder and R. H. Lovell (whose full Christian name is to the
said grand inquest unknown), as insolvent debtors, and partners under the name of Prescott, Snyder and Lovell, who
thereupon afterward, to wit, on a certain day mentioned, were
adjudged bankrupts; that prior to the dates last aforesaid, and
within three months before the commencement of said proceedings in bankruptcy, to wit, on the 16th day of August,
1869, within the jurisdiction of this court, and at and in the
District of Wisconsin, the said Alphonso Prescott, Leander F.
Snyder and R. H. Lovell, then and there representing themselves to be associated together as copartners, under the firm
of Prescott, Snyder and Lovell, and holding themselves out as
wholesale merchants and jobbers of boots and shoes, under
the false color and pretense of carrying on business and dealing
in the ordinary course of trade of wholesale boot and shoe
merchants and jobbers, did then and there wrongfully, unlawfully and feloniously obtain on credit, from one Lyman Dike,
certain goods and chattels, to wit, a large quantity of boots
and shoes, of the value of five thousand dollars, with the intent then and there by the obtaining of said goods and chattels, to defraud the said Lyman Dike, contrary.to the statute
of the United States in such case made and provided, and
against the peace and dignity of the United States of America.
There are other like counts of the indictment, except as
to tte names of persons from whom goods had been obtainei
by defendants.
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It is alleged in the motion to quash the indictment that it
is defective in not setting forth the manner in which the proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced, and also in the description of the goods, etc.
The court exercises jurisdiction in bankruptcy as limited by
the act; and proceedings must be commenced and prosecuted
substantially as the act directs. Neither as to the proceedings,
nor the jurisdiction, of the court in bankruptcy, is it sufficient
in an indictment under the act to rely merely upon a general
averment. All matters necessary to constitute the offense must
be pleaded. It.is not sufficient as in this indictment to aver
that proceedings in bankruptcy were duly commenced. It
must be pleaded and proven in order to convict, that a petition
in bankruptcy was presented to the District Court by a certain
creditoi, naming him, and also the amount of the debt of such
petitioning creditor, and the alleged cause of bankruptcy, and
the adjudication of bankruptcy. It must appear affirmatively
that the creditor had a right under the law to commence and
prosecute proceedings in bankruptcy. The amount of his debt
must appear, otherwise the court would have no jurisdiction.
Of the Banknipt Consolidated Act of 12 and 13 Victoria,
section 44: of the act under which the indictment in question
was framed, is also a literal copy. Several decisions of courts
in England, as to requirements in the prosecution and trial of
indictments under their act were made and published before
the passage of Congress of our Bankrupt Act, and to which I
refer as proper for consideration: Regina v. Lands, 33 English
Law and Eq. Reports 536; Regina v. Ewington, 41 English
Common Law Reports 178 ; The King v. Jones, 24 Idem. 156.
It must appear that the bankrupt obtained goods within three
months of the bankruptcy, by means of a representation which
he knew to be false, that he was carrying on business and
dealing in the ordinary course of trade, and such representations must be actually made by him: Regina v. Boyd, 5
Cox 502.
The description of the goods obtained by defendants is too
uncertain; instead of a large quantity of boots and shoes, a certain number of pairs of boots and also of shoes, or a certain
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number of packages in boxes of boots, and also of shoes should
be described. This could be ascertained from the bills of sale.
The description of the goods in an indictment should be as
definite as in a declaration in trover.
The word feloniously should be omitted in indictments under
the act. The offenses made indictable are misdemeanors. And
in drawing indictments, figures for dates should not be used.
This being the first indictment in this court under the
Bankrupt Act, I have prepared this opinion as a guide to the
District Attorney in future.
The indictment will be quashed.

Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi.
M'GUMRE V. STEVENS ET AL.
Specific performance of a contract to sell land cannot be decreed unless the
contract identifies the land, or furnishes the means of so doing.
Under the statutes of frauds, parol evidence is not admissible to supply the
want of such identification of the land in the written contract.
Parol evidence of what parties to a written contract intended to mpress is not
admissible. Where parol evidence is received at all to explain written instruments, it is to explain what was realy expressed.
A bill in equity to enforce a parol contract for the sale of land cannot'be
maintained in Mississippi, and part performance will not take a parol sale of
lands out of the statute of frauds.

IN 1863 one Charles M. Stevens contracted with the appellant to sell him a lot of land, the title to which was in the ap.
pellee, James 0. Stevens. Certain receipts of the said James
0. Stevens and Charles M. Stevens acknowledging the receipt
of certain sums of money from the appellant in part payment
for a house and lot, without designating the same or referring
to anything by *'hichthey could be ascertained were the only
evidence in writing of the contract.
The appellant filed his bill in chancery for a conveyance of
said lot to him, and for an injunction to restrain the prosecution
of an action of ejectment against him by the appellee, Jane E.
Stevens, to whom the said property had subsequently been con-
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veyed by the said James 0. Stevens. To this bill the appellees
demurred. The demurrer was sustained by the court, and
the bill dismissed. From this decree the plaintiff appealed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PEYTrON, J--The main question for our determination is
whether this contract is such that it can be specifically enforced
under our statute to prevent frauds and perjuries, which provides that no action shall be brought upon any contract for
the sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, unless the proraise or agreement upon which such action shall be brought,
or some memorandum or note thereofg shall be in writing, and
signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other
person by him or her thereunto lawfully authorized: Rev. Code
858 Art. 1. It is insisted by the counsel for the appellees
thatthe specific performance of the contract cannot be enforced
on account of the uncertainty of its subject matter. We think
this is the correct view of it. For every agreement which is
required to be in writing, by the statute of frauds must be certain of itself or capable of being made so by reference to something else, whereby the terms can be ascertained with reasonable precision, otherwise it cannot be carried into effect. Abeel
V. Radcliffe, 13 John. 297; Fry on Specific Performance 166.
Oral evidence is inadmissible for the purpose of supplying
an omission in an instrument where written evidence is required by law, because to admit it would virtually be to give
to oral the superior force of written evidence and occasion
that to pass by parol, which by law ought not to pass but by
writing. And it is upon the same principle inadmissable to
give any effect to a written instrument, which is void in law
for uncertainty. 3 Starkies' Ev. 1000; Woollam v. Hearn,
2 White & Tuddr's Leading Cases in Equity 589.
It is well settled both in England and in this country that,
since the statute of frauds, there can be no specific execution
of a contract in respect to land, unless the parties have de
scribed and identified the particular tract which is to pass
from one to the other, or unless the contract furnishes the
means of identifying the land to be conveyed with certainty
-1 Sugden on Vendors 118; Blagden v. Bladbear,12 Vesey
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466; Beed's heirs v. Hornback, 4 J. J. Marshall 377; Allen v.
Bennett, 8 S. & M. 681.
In the case of Wilkinson v. Davis' administrator,the court
says, that every contract or deed for the conveyance of land
must define its identity, and fix its locality, or there must be
such a description of the land as by the aid of parol evideice
will readily point to its locality and boundaries. But if the
contract is void by reason of the uncertainty in the description
of the subject matter, parol evidence is not admissible to supply the omission. Freeman's Chy. Rep. 58. A receipt for a
sum of money expressing that it was the cash part of the purchase of a lot of land without specifying the terms of the
contract, is not such a memorandum as will take the case out
of the statute against frauds and perjuries: Ellis v. Deadman's heirs, 4 Bibb. 466; AlZen v. Bennett, 8 S. & M. 681.
It seems to be settled that direct evidence of intention as
contradistinguished from evidenceto show the intent expressed
by the words or language of an instrument is inadmissable.
Extrinsic evidence is admissable only to construe and apply
the terms of the writing. The rule in such cases confines the
inquiry to the meaning of the word sed, and hence-all extrinsic evidence tending to prove, not what the party has expressed,
but what he intended to express, is obviously calculated to throw
no light on the real matter in dispute. In the case at bar
there is nothing in the receipts to point out or locate the lot,
nor is there anything referred to therein to identify it, or by
which its location can be ascertained. They are too vague
and uncertain to be the foundation of a decree. It has been
held by the Supreme Court of the United States that if the
land granted be so inaccurately described as to render its
identity wholly uncertain, the grant is void: Boardman v.
The Lessees of Beed, 6 Peters 345; GreenleafEv. 350, see. 301.
The agreement in this case is too indefinite and uncertain
to authorize a decree for specific performance of it. And to
let in parol testimony to supply the omission in the agreement
would be to allow that to pass by parol, which by law ought
not to pass, but by writing, and would open the door to all
tb, . mischief intended to be provided against by the statute.
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This court has repeatedly decided that a bill to enforce a
parol contract for the sale of land cannot be maintained in this
state, and that part performance will not take a parol sale of
lands out of the statute of frauds. The statute contains no exception in regard to such contracts and it is not for us to
create'exceptions where none exist in the statute: Beamanv.
Buck, 9 S. & M., 210; Box v. Stanford, 13 S. & M., 93.
•For these reasons we think the court below did not err in
Lustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill

Supreme Court of Michigan.
THE PEOPLE EX EEL. THE DETROIT AND HOWELL R. R. CO
V. THE TOWNSHIP BOARD OF SALEM.
It is a fundamental principle in the law of taxation that taxes must be laid
for a jmUbc and not a mere private purpose.
A statute authorizing the levy and couecuon of a tax to aid railway compames in the construction of their roads violates this fundamental principle
and is void.
A statute which undertakes to confer upon ainmjorityof the voters of a town.
ship authority to vote a tax, the proceeds of which are to be given to railway
corporations to aid in the construction of roads to run through the township,
is not an enactment authorized by the taxing power of the state.
The nature and extent of the taxing power, and the limitations upon it, dis.
ussed by CoorEY, J.

This was a motion for a mandamus. In 1864 the legislature
passed an act allowing certain townships to pledge their credit to
aid in the construction of certain railroads. The electors of the
townships were authorized to hold meetings to determine what
amount should be raised for this purpose, and the form, mode of
issuing, and other particulars relating to the securities by which
the credit was to be given: Laws of 1864, p. 96.
Under this act the township of Salem voted aid to the extent of
five per centum of its assessed valuation ; but the meeting at which
the vote was taken was irregular for want of sufficient notice, and
a special act of the legislature was obtained to legalize the same.
The township board refused to issue the securities voted, claiming
that the Act of 1864 was in excess of legislative authority, and
therefore unconstitutional and void, and that the township vote was
in consequence a nullity. The railroad company thereupon applied
for a writ of mandamus to compel the delivery of the securities.
CooLEY, J.-I suppose if the legislative act in question can be
sustained at all, it must be so sustained under the general authority
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of the state to prescribe and determine the objects to be provided
for, fostered or aided through the expenditures ofthe publi. muneys.
In other words it must be regarded as an incipient step in the exercise of the sovereign power of taxation. This power, we are
told, is not, and from its very nature cannot be, controlled and
limited by precise and accurate rules, which shall designate and
define in all cases the particular purposes for which alone money
may be raised, or to which they may be appropriated when raised,
or the extent of the burden which may be imposed, and it is added that upon all these points a broad and uncontrollable discretion is necessarily invested in the legislative department of every
government.
It is conceded, nevertheless, that there are certain limitations
upon this power, not prescribed in express terms by any constitutional provision, but inherent in the subject itself, which attendits
exercise under all circumstances, and which are as inflexible and
absolute in their restraints as if directly imposed in the most positive form of words. It is not doubted by any one that the power
of the legislature to determine for what purposes taxes shall be
levied, and what districts of territory and what classes of persons
and property shall bear the burden, is verybroad and it must be confessed that in describing or defining it words are stometimes employed by the courts which import an absolute and unlimited discretion, such as might exist in an irresponsible government, or in
the people, if acting in their sovereign capacity, without any written constitution, and which consequently could not be brought to
the test of any restrictive rules. For many purpores these broad
and loose definitions of the power of taxation are not objectionable,
but they cannot be regarded as careful and precise enough to be
tests of constitutional authority, and whenever they are employed
in the law the modifications by familiar constitutional principles
are always to be understood.
I understand that, in order to render valid a burden imposed by
the legislature under an exercise of the power of taxation, the following requisites must appear:
1. It must be imposed for a public, and not for a mere private
purpose. Taxation is a mode of raising revenues for public purposes only, and, as is said in some of the cases, where it is prostituted to objects in no way connected with the public interest or wel.
fare, it ceases to be taxation and becomes plunder: Sharpless v.
Mayor, 21 Penn. St. 168; Grim v. Weisenberg School District,57
Penn. St. 433; Broadhead v. Milwaukee, 9 Wis. 652.
2. The tax must be laid according to some rule of apportionment; not arbitrarily or by caprice, but so that the burden may be.
made to fall with something like impartiality upon the persons or
property upon which it justly and equitably should rest. A sta-v
burden is not to be imposed upon any territory smaller than th
whole state, nor a county burden upon any territory smaller or
greater than the county. Equality in the imposition of the burden
is of the very essence of the power itself, and though absolute
equality and absolute justice are never attainable, the adoption oi
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somerule tending tothat end is indispensable: Weeks v..Milwaukee,
10 Wis. 258: Byerson v. Uttley, 16 Mich. 269; Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen 504.
3. As a corollary from the preceding, if the tax is imposed upon
one of the municipal sub-divisions of the State only, the purpose
must not only be a public purpose, as regards the people of that
sub-division, but it must also be local; that is to say, the people of
that municipality must have a special and peculiar interest in the
object to be accomplished, which will make it just, proper and
equitable that they should bear the burden, rather than the State
at large, or any more considerable portion of the State: Wells v.
Weston, 22 Mo. 285: Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Mon. 491;
Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82.
The three principles here stated are fundamental maxims in the
law of taxation. 'They inhere as conditions in the power to impose
any taxes whatsoever, or to create any burden for which taxation
is to provide; and it is only when they are observed that the legislative department is exercising an authority overthis subject which
it has received from the people, and only then is that supreme legisat ive discretion of which the authorities speak called into action.
No discretionary power in that department is so absolute, and no
judgment it can pronounce is so conclusive, as to preclude the citizen's contesting it whenever he believes his rights have been invaded by a disregard of any of these conditions. The duty of considering such a question is both unwelcome and undesirable, but
it is not a duty which can be avoided, and we have no disposition
to postpone its performance.
I propose first to inquire whether the purpose to be accomplished
by the act in question is a public purpose, in the sense implied
when burdens are to be imposed under the legislative power over
the subject of taxation.
I do not understand that the word public, when employed ir
reference to this power, is to be construed or applied in any narrow
or illiberal sense, or in any sense which would preclude the legislature from taking broad views of st ate interest, necessity or policy
or from giving those views effect by means of public revenues.
Necessity alone is not the test by which the limits of state authority in this direction are to be defined, but a wise statesmanship must
look beyond the expenditures which are absolutely needful to the
continued existence of organized government, and embrace others
which may tend to make that subserve the general well-being or
society, and advance the present and prospective happiness and
prosperity of the people. To erect the public buildings, to compensate the public officers, and to discharge the public debts, are not
the sole purpose to which the public revenues may be applied, but
on the contrary, considerations of natural equity, gratitude and
charity, are never out of place when the general good of the whole
people is in question, and may be kept in view in the imposition of
the public burdens. The sovereign legislative authority mustjudge
of the force of such considerations on a general view of the just and
proper demands upon the public treasury, and of the ability of the
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people to provide for all; and when that authority determines that
such payments will subserve the public good, the responsibility
of the legislator for the correctness of his judgment must be to the
people whose representative he is, and upon whom the burdens he
imposes must rest.
Nor has it ever been doubted that where the object of taxation
was one of general interest to all parts of the State, it was competent for the State, instead of assuming the burden directly, and providing for it by means of a general state levy, to apportion it
among the several counties and towns, and to authorize and require
them to provide for it by local taxation. Our own state pursues
this course invariably, as regards its general burdens; in this respct following what I understand to be the general system of the country and the result demonstrates taht it is practicable, wise and expedient to make use of the local machinery as the best means of
reaching all the people without confusion and without exciting
discontent. There is not only nothing in this course inconsistent
with correct principles, but, on the contrary, it is in most perfect
accord with other features of our governmentalfpolicy, the general
purpose being to leave with the local communities in managing the
public affairs which concern them the largest possible liberty of
action which is consistent with the general public order and good
government.
In the present case it appears that the object of the burden is not
to raise money for a purpose of general state interest. Its object,
on the contrary, is to create a demand which shall be a burden
upon a small portion of the State only. On the ground of local
benefit a small district of the State is to be taxed to encourage a
local enterprise, which it is supposed will be of such peculiar local
advantage that this district, rather than the State at large, or any
greater or smaller portion of the State, should contribute to its construction. The road, when constructed, is nevertheless to be exclusively private property, owned, controlled and operated by a private
corporation for the benefit of its own members, and to be subject
to the supervision and control of the State only as other private
property is, with such few exceptions as the state, in granting the
corporate powers, has stipulated for, in order to secure impartiality
in the management of its business, and to prevent extortion.
Primarily, therefore, the money, when raised, is to benefit a private
corporation, to add to its funds and improve its property; and the
benefit to the public is to be secondary and incidental, like that
which springs from the building of a grist mill, the establishment
of a factory, the opening of a public inn, or from any other private
t.uiterprise, which accommodates a local want, and tends to increasq
local value.
A railroad, however, it is said, is a public highway, and as such
its construction is a public purpose, which may be accomplished
through the instrumentality of the sovereign power of eminent
domain, even when individuals, and not the State, are to own and
2ontrol it. This argument is supposed to posess great force, znd
it therefore becomes our duty to examine it with some care It is
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true that a railroad in the hands of a private corporation is often
spoken of as a public highway, and that it has been recognized as
so far a public object as to justify the appropriation of private property for its construction, but this fact does not conclusively determine the right to employ taxation in aid of the road in the like
case. Reasoning by analogy from one of the sovereign powers of
government to another is exceedingly liable to deceive and mislead.
An object may be public in one sense, and for one purpose, when in
a general sense, and for other purposes, it would be idle and misleading to apply the same term. All governmental powers exist for
public purposes, but they are not necessarily to be exercised under
the same conditions of public interest. The sovereign power which
the State possesses is to be exercised only for the general public
welfare, but it reaches to every person, to every kind of ltusiness, to
every species of property within the commonwealth. The conduct
of every individual and the use of all property and all rights is regulated by it, to any extent found necessary for the preservatiou of
the public order, Vnd also for the protection of the private rights
of one individual against encroachment by others. The :overeign
power of taxation is employed in a great many cases where the
power of eminent domain might be made more immediately efficient
and available, if constitutional principles would suffer it to be resorted to; but each of these powers has its own peculiar and appropriate sphere, and the object which is public for the demands of
one is not necessarily of a character to permit the exercise of another.
I have said that railroads are often spoken of as a species of public highway. They are such in the sense that they accommodate
the public travel, and that they are regulated by laws with a view
to preclude partiality in their accommodations. But their resemblance to the highways which belong to the public, which the people make and keep in repair, and which are open to the whole public to be used at will, and with such means of locomotion as taste,
or pleasure, or convenience may dictate, is rather fanciful than
otherwise, and has been made prominent perhaps rather from the
necessity of resorting to the right of eminent domain for theirestabl;shment than for any other reason. They are not, when in private
hands, the people's highways; but they are private property, whose
owners make it their business to transport persons and merchandise
in their own carriages, over their own land, for such pecuniary
compensation as may be stipulated. These owners carry on, for
their own benefit, a business which has, indeed, its public aspect,
inasmuch as it accommodates a public want, and its establishment
is consequently, in a certain sense, a public purpose. But it is not
such a purpose in any other or different sense than would be the
opening of a hotel, the establishment of a line of stages, or the putting in operation of a grist mill, each of which may, under proper
circumstances, be regarded as a local necessity, in which the local
public may take an interest beyond what they would feel in other
objects for which the right to impose taxation would be unquestionable. The business of railroading in private hands is not to be distin.
guished in its legal characteristics from either of the other kinds of
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business here named, or from many others which might be mentioned: but in the case of Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin justly treated with very little consideration the claim of a right.to favor, under the power of taxation,
the construction of a public hotel, though the aid was to be rendered expressly "in view of the great public benefit which the construction of the hotel would be to the city." The court expressly
declared that the public could not be compelled to aid such an enterprise from any regard to the incidental benefit which the public were to receive therefrom.
The right of eminent domain is a vital right in every government,
and must often be called into exercise when a special necessity demands that the private right in a particular piece of property shall
give way for the public good. This right, it has been held, may
be exercised on behalf of railways in the hands of private parties.
But there can be no doubt, I think, that this holding was a considerable modification of common law principles, though at the same
time it must be admitted that it was on such strong grounds of
necessity and policy, and in view of considerations so entirelynew,
as fully to excuse and, indeed, to justify it. No principle was older, and none seemed better understood or more inflexible than that
one man's property could not be taken under the power of the
government and transferred to another againstthe will of the owner;
but the State, nevertheless, is allowed to do so in the case of railroads, under the guise of a convenient fiction, which treats a corporation managing its own property for its own profit as merely a public convenience and agency. Nothing but an overriding public
necessity could ever have led the courts to this judgment, for when
the relations between the proprietors of a railroad and the public
are examined, we perceive at once that the idea of an agency, in a
-legal sense, is inadmissible. They are public agents in the same
sense that the proprietors of many other kinds of private business
are, and not in any other or different sense. To illustrate this I
might draw many exact parallels, but a single one will be sufficient
for our purpose. The Michigan Central Railroad Company makes a
business of transporting persons and property over its road for the
benefit of its stockholders, but at rates which the State has regulated, and on the condition which the State has prescribed, of furnishing impartial accommodation. It does so, moreover, under a charter from the State, from which it derives its authority, and for this
charter it has rendered, or is supposed to have rendered, a compensation. The hackmen of Detroit make a business of transporting
persons and property over shorter routes, for their own profit, and
in like manner, at rates which the law regulates, and on the like
conditions of impartiality. To render the analogy closer, they are
required to obtain a license from the public authorities to follow
this calling, and for this license a fee is exacted. Like the railroad
corporation, they supply a public want, and if the former can be
called a public agency, the latter, it must be conceded, are entitled
o stand in the same category.
If we examine the subject critically we shall find that the most
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important consideration in the case of eminent domain is the
necessity of accomplishing some public good which is otherwise impracticable, and we shall also find that the law does not so much
regard the means as the need. The power in much nearer akin to
that of the public police than to that of taxation; it goes but a step
further, and that step isin the same direction. Every man has an
abstract right to the exclusive use of his own property for his own
enjoyment in such manner as he may choose; but if he should
choose to create a nuisance upon it, or to do anything which would
preclude a reasonable enjoyment of adjacent property, the law
would interfere to impose restraint. He is said to own his private
lot to the center of the earth, but he would not be allowed to excavate it indefinitely lest his neighbor's lot should disappear in the
excavation. The abstract right to make use of his own property
in his own way is compelled to yield to the general comfort and
protection of the community, and to a proper regard to relative
rights in others. The situation of his property may even be such
that he is compelled to dispose of it, because the law will not suffer
his regular business to be carried on upon it. A needful andlawful
species of manufacture may so injuriously aff'ectthe health and comfort of the vicinity that it cannot be tolerated in a densely settled
neighborhood, and therefore the owner of a lot in that neighborhood
will not be allowed to engage in that manufacture upon it, even
though it be his regular and legitimate business. The butcherin the
vicinity of whose premises a village has grown up, finds himself compelled to remove his business elsewhere, because his rightto make use
of his lot as a place for the slaughter of cattle has become inconsistent with the superior right of the community to the enjoyment of
pure air and the accompanying blessings and comforts. The owner
of a lot within the fire limits of a city may be compelled to part
with theproperty because he is unable to erectabrickor stone structure upon it, and the local regulations will not permit one of wood.
Eminent domain only recognizes and enforces the superior right of
the community against the selfishness of individuals in a similar
way. Every branch of needful industry has a right to exist, the community has a right to demand that it be permitted to exist, and if
for that purpose a peculiar locality already in possession of an individual is essential, the owner's right to undisturbed occupancy
must yield to the superior interest of the public. A railroad can
not go around the farm of every unwilling person, and the business
of transporting persons and property for long distances by rail,
which has been found so essential to the general enjoyment and
welfare, could never have existed if it were in the power of any unwilling person to stop the road at his boundary, or to demand unreasonable terms as a condition of passing him. The law interferes
in these cases and regulates the relative rights of the owner and of
the community, with as strict regard to justice and equity as the
circumstances will permit. It does not deprive the owner of his
property, but it compels him to dispose of so much of it as is essential on equitable terms. While, therefore, eminent domain ea-
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tablishes no industry, it so regulates the relative rights of all that no
individual shall have it in his power to preclude its establishment.
It is proper, however, to add the remark, even where the necessity is conceded, I do not understand that the right of eminent
domain can be exercised on behalf of private parties or corporations,
unless the state in permitting it reserves to itself a right to super
vise and control the use by subh regulations as shall ensure to the
public the benefit promised thereby, and as shall preclude the pur
pose which the public had in view in authorizing the appropria
tion being defeated by partiality or unreasonably selfish action on
the part of those who, only on the ground of public convenience
and welfare, have been suffered to make the appropriation.
In the case of Ladlee v.Langham, 34 Ala. 311, it was held by
the Supreme Court of Alabama, that the right of eminent domain
might be exercised on behalf of mills which ground grain for toll,
and were compelled by law to render impartial service for all, when
it could not be for other mills; and the distinction made is a very
reasonable one. Except that the necessity is wanting, there would
be the same justification for the condemnation of lands for stables
for the public draymen of a city, as for a way for a railroad; the
like power of regulating the use existing in each case, and the purpose in one being public in precisely the same sense as in the other.
But when we examine thepower oftaxation with a view to ascertain the purposes for which burdens maybe impbsed uponthe public, we perceive at once that necessity is not the governing consideration, and that in many cases it has little or nothing to do with the
question presented. Certain objects must of necessity be provided
for under this power, but in regard to innumerable other objects for
which the state imposes taxes upon its citizens the question is always
one of mere policy, and if the taxes are imposed, it is not because
it is absolutely necessary that those objects should be accomplished,
but because on the whole it is deemed best by the public authorities that they should be. On the other hand certain things of absolute necessity to civilized society the state is precluded, either by
express constitutional provisions, or by necessary implication, from
providing for at all, and they are left wholly to the fostering care
ofprivate enterprise and private liberality. We concede for instance,
that religion is essential, and that without it we should degenerate
to barbarism and brutality, yet we prohibit the State from burdening the citizen with its support, and we content ourselves with
recognizing and protecting its observance on secular grounds. Certain professions and occupations in life are also essential, but we
have no authority to employ the public moneys to induce persons
to enter them The necessity may be pressing, and to supply it may
be in a certain sense to accomplish a "public purpose ;" but it is
not a purpose for which the power of taxation may be employed.
The public necessity for an educated and skillful physician in some
particular locality may be great and pressing, yet if the people
should be taxed to hire one to locate there, the common voice would
exclaim that the public moneys were being devoted to a private
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purpose. The opening of a new street in a city or village may be
of trifiingpublic importance, as compared with the location within
it of some new business of manufacture, but while the right to pay
out the public funds for the one would be unquestionable, the other,
by common consent, is classified as a private interest, which the
public can aid as individuals if they see fit, while they are not permitted to employ the machinery of the government to that end.
Indeed the opening of a new street in the outskirts of a city is generally very much more a matter of private interest than of public
concern, so much so that the owner of the land voluntarily throws
it open to the public without compensation; -yet even in a case
where the public authorities did not regard the street as of sufficient
importance to induce their taking the necessary action to secure it,
it would not be doubted that the moment they should consent to
accept it as a gift, the street would at once become a public object
and purpose, upon which the public funds might be expended with
no more restraints upon the action of the authorities in that particular, than if it was the most prominent and essential thoroughfare of the city.
By common consent, also, a large portion of the most urgent
needs of society are relegated exclisively to the law of demand and
supply. It is this in its natural operation, and without the interference of the government, that gives us the proper proportion of
tillers of the soil, artisans, manufacturers, merchants and professional men, and that determines when and where they shall give to
society the benefit of their particular services. However great the
need in the direction of any particular calling, the interference of
the government is not tolerated, because, though it might be sup.
plying a public want, it is considered as invading the domain that
belongs exclusively to private inclination and enterprise. We .perceive, therefore, that the term "public purpose," as employed to
denote the objects for which taxes may be levied, has no relation to
the urgency of the public need, or to the extent of the public benefit
which is to follow. It is, on the other hand, merely a term of classification to distinguish the objects for which, according to settled
usage, the government is to provide,from those which, by the like
usage, are left toprivateinclination,interest or liberality.
It creates a broad and manifest distinction--one in regard to
which there need be neither doubt nor difficulty-between public
works and private enterprises: between the public conveniences
which it is the business of government to provide and those which
private interest and competition will supply whenever the demand
is sufficient. When we draw this line of distinction, we perceive
immediately that the present case falls outside of it. It was at one
time in this State deemed true policy that the government should
supply railroad facilities to the traveling and commercial public,
and while that policy prevailed, the right of taxation for the purpose was unquestionable. Our policy in that respect has.changed;
railroads are no longer public works, but private property; individuals, and notthe State, own.and controlthem for their own profit;
the public may reap many and-large benefits from them. and indeed
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are expected to do so, but only incidentally, and oniy as they might
reap similar benefits from other modes of investing private capital.
It is no longer recognized as proper or politic that the State should
supply the means of locomotion by rail to the people, and this spe
cies of work is therefore remitted to the care of private enterprise,
"and cannot be aided by the public funds any more than any other
private undertaking, which in like manner falls outside the line of
distinction indicated.
In the course of the argument in this case allusion was made to
the power of the State to pay bounties. But it is not in the power
of the State, in my opinion, under the name of a bounty, or under
any other covering or subterfuge, to furnish the capital to set private
parties up in any kind of business, or to subsidize their business
after they have entered upon it. A bounty law, of which this is
the real nature, is void, whatever may be the pretence on which it
may be enacted. The right to hold out pecuniary inducements to
the faithful performance of public duty in dangerous or responsible
positions, stands upon a different footing altogether; nor have I
any occasion to question the right to pay rewards for the destruction of wild beasts-a provision of this character being a mere
police regulation. But the discrimination by the State between
different classes of occupations, and the favoring of one at the expense of the rest, whether that one be farming or banking, merchandizing or milling, printing or railroading, is not legitimate
legislation, and is an invasion of that equality of right and privilege which is a maxim in State government. When the door is
once opened to it there is no line at which we can stop and say with
confidence that thus far we may go with safety and propriety, but
no farther. Every honest employment is honorable; it is beneficial
to the public; it deserves encouragement. The more successful we
can make it, the more does it generally subserve the public good.
But it is not the business of the State to make discriminations in
favor of one class against another, or in favor of one employment
against another. The State can have no favorites. Its business is
to protect the interests of all, and to give all the benefit of equal
laws. It cannot compel an unwilling minority to submit to taxation in order that it may keep upon its feet any business that cannot
stand alone. Moreover, it is not a weak interest only that can give
plausable reasons for public aid. When the State once enters upon.
the business of subsidies, we shall not fail to discover that the
strong and powerful interests are those most likely to control legislation, and that the weaker will be taxed to enhance the profits of
the stronger. I shall not question the right of the people, by their
c:onstitution, to open the door to such discrimination, but in this
State they have not adopted that policy, and they have not authorized any department of the government to adopt it for them.
It scarcely seems necessary to say that what the State, as a political community, cannot do, it cannot require the inferior municipalities to do. When the case is found to stand entirely outsid
the admain of taxation, State burdens and township burdens are
%like precluded ; no township vote and no township majority, how'-
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ever large, can effect the principle; any single individual has a
right to insist that the public do not own or control his property
for the purpose of donations.
It may be proper to mention the maxim which is pressed upon
our consideration, that the legislature must pass upon the proper
objects as well as the proper extent of taxation, not only in the
case of the State at large, but in the case also of the several municipal corporations. Those corporations certainly have no inherent
power of taxation, but take only so much as the State shall see fit
to allow, and under such restrictions as the legislature may think
proper to impose. I shall concede also that they are not left to
their option to exercise the power or to decline to exercise it; for
as regards alike the general purposes of the State and those of a
more local concern they are to tax as they are bidden and may be
compelled to obey the legislative will. The power of coercion and
control is nevertheless to be exercised in view of and in subordination to those maxims of local self-government which pervade
our whole system, and which preclude arbitrary and unaccustomed
impositions, however desirable, in the opinion of the legislature,
the object to be attained may appear to be.
If the township of Salem can be required to tax itself in aid of
the Detroit and Howell Railroad Company, it must be either, first,
on the ground of incidental local benefit in the enhancement of
values, or, second, in consideration of the facilities which the road
is to afford to the township for travel and business. The first
ground is wholly inadmissible. The incidental benefit which any
enterprise may bring to the public has never been recognized as
sufficient of itself to bring the object within the sphere of taxation.
In the case of streets and similar publiq improvements, the benefits received by individuals have sometimes been accepted as a proper
basis on which to apportion the burden; but in all such cases the
power to tax is unquestionable, irrespective of the benefits. The
question on such cases has not been of the right to tax, but of the
proper basis of apportionment where the right was conced3d.
The second ground is more plausible. To state the case in the
form of a contract, it would stand thus: The township is to give or
loan to the railroad company five per cent. of its assessed valuation. In consideration whereof the railroad company agrees to
construct and operate their road, and to hold themselves ready at
all times to give to the people of the township the facilities of travel
and trade upon it, provided they will pay for such facilities the
same rates which are to be charged to all other persons. In other
words, the company agree, on being secured the sum mentioned,
to take upon themselves the business of common carriers within
the limits of the township.
If this consideration is sufficient in the case of common carriers,
it must be sufficient also in the case of any other employment.
There is nothing in the business of carrying goods and nassengers
which gives the person who conducts it a claim upon tle public
different in its nature from that of the manufacturer or the merchant Neither is it of the least importance in a legal point of view
32

THE PEOPLE V. TOWNSHIP BOARD.

that the carrier is usually a corporation, while the other kinds of
business named are more commonly carried on by single individuals
or partnerships. These are accidental circumstances, which may oi
may not exist in any particular case. But if the legislature should
pass an act providing that the township of Salem should give or
loan a certain percentage of its taxable property to any merchant
who will undertake to erect a store within the township, and to
hold himself ready at all times to sell goods therein to the people of
the township on terms as favorable as those he would exact from
others, he would be a bold man who should undertake to defend
such legislation on constitutional principles. Yet the case would
possess all the elements of public interest which are to be found in
the case before us ; the public convenience would be subserved, and
there would be alike tendency to increase local values. The difference in the cases would be in degree, and not in kind; and it would
be easy to suggest enterprises as tq which the comparison, even in
degree, would not beto the advantage of the railroad. And when
we have once determined that a municipal government can tax its
citizens to make a donation to a railroad company, because of the
identical benefits expected from its operations, we do not go a single
step further when we hold that it may use the public funds to erect
a cotton or woolen factory, or a building suited to the manufacture
of tobacco, and present it, on grounds *ofpublic benefit, to any person who will occupy it.
Such a case would not, by any means, be an extreme application
of the principles contended for in the present proceeding. Newspapers are as much a public necessity as railroads. The city of
Detroit contains several corporations which are carrying on the
business of publishing such papers. Why should not the corporators, instead of furnishing from their own means the capital necessary to start themselvesin business, have applied to the legislature
for an act authorizing the city to tax itself for that. purpose? It is
as difficult to make a success of a great newspaper as of a great
railroad; the projectors do not more often make the business profitable to themselves; there are consequently all the same arguments
to be advanced in favor of gratuities in their aid which are advancedl
here. We can go backto stage coaches as easily as we can dispense
with the daily paper, which gives us the current news. It maybe
that, if this class of public benefactors were to be pensioned at the
public expense, it would prove difficult for the legislature to deal
with the subject with entire impartiality; the political majority
might regard those papers only as useful and deserving of encouragement which inculcated their own political views; but this would
hardly be a question of law; and it they saw fit to allow those townships and cities, which were disposed to do so, to vote aid to the
party organs, the unwilling minority who did not believe in the
benefits to be derived from such organs, would be silenced by the
decision we should render in favor of the present aid. The legislature would have determinied that the purpose was "public; "1the
need, in order to put an establishment upon a successful footing,
would generally be very apparent and pressing; the benefits ex-
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peeted would be great, especially to the majority party, and we
are not permitted to doubt that the local public, in very many cases,
would sanction such legislation by voting the required aid. Newspapers are frequently started or aided by voluntary subscriptions,
when a concerted effort onthe par&ofthe subscribers would be very
likely to induce the local majority to shoulder the voluntary burden upon the public. The farmer, the merchant, the manufacturer,
or the mechanic of the minority, who had been obliged when starting his own business to furnish his own capital, might think it unjust that he was now obliged to render compulsory aid in supplying the ,apital for the business of others, but the complaint would
be unimportant if the majority could be induced to acquiesce, and
with the peculiar facilities which the favored interest possesses for
the contest of the public sentiment, we cannot doubt that it would
be quite as successful as the "public good" would require in securing legislative action and favorable local votes.
I have stated the case on behalf of the railroad as strongly as is
possible, for I have assumed that the road is certain to be constructed, and to be operated afterward, though the act in question
makes no very effectual provision to that end, and the railroad company demand the bonds without expecting to give any security that
the township will ever receive the expected benefit from its expenditure. The opposition to this proceeding may be based, for aught
we know, upon a conviction that the enterprise cannot succeed, and
that the money must consequently be wasted; but I prefer not to
consider the case in any other light than that which is most favorable to the relator, and I shall therefore assume that the legislature
has established all possible safeguards against loss or disappointment, and that those safeguards would prove effectual. And regarding the case in that light, it rests, in my view, upon fallacies
which are transparent, and upon doctrines which, followed to their
legitimate results, will leave us wholly at sea as regards the objects
of taxation, and will justify a resort to that measure for almost any
private purpose which can be suggested. It is said, however, that
there is an overwhelming weight of authority in support of this species of legislation. This statement is very often made with great
emphasis, but without a foundation proportioned to the energy with
which it is repeated. There is, indeed, a considerable number of
cases which for diverse and irreconcileable reasons have supported
local taxation for objects of general interest, but many of these
cases have not the least relevancy to the point here contested. Such
cases, for instance, as Thomas v.Leland, 24 Wendell 65, and Mierrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen, 504, where local communities, on the
ground of special local benefit, have been allowed or compelled to
tax themselves in aid of the public works or buildings owned by the
State, are not at all an alogous. Where the State itself is to receive
the benefit of the taxation, in the increase of its public fund, or the
improvement of its property, there can be no doubt of the public
character of the purpose. Such of the other judicial decisions as
are best reasoned, rest plainly upon the doctrine that the State
having within itself unlimited authority to aid works of internal
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improvement, may use its municipal bodies as its agencies for that
p'rpose-a doctrine which is precluded by express provision in the
Constitution of this state. If we set aside these two classes of
cases, very little real authority remains to support the doctrine
contended for. The right to vote municipal aid to railroads has
been vigorously disputed from the beginning, and many eminent
jurists have always denied it. I regard with the utmost respect
the courts which have preceded us in considering this question, but
we should be willfully blind if we shut our eyes to the fact that
there have always been circumstances surr6unding the consideration of this subject which have not been favorable to a complete
and unbiassed expression of views. It is easy to follow an apparent authority without stopping to question its soundness, when
the popular desire is in the same direction; and upon this subject
there are repeated decisions which do not, by any new reasoning,
or by any attempt to examine the subject on principle, add at all
to the authority of those which preceded them. When cases follow in line for no better reason than because they have a case to
follow, the authority is to be found in the first decision, and not by
counting up the number in the line. The leading case upon the subject has been the Pennsylvania case of Sharpless v. Mayer, 21
Penn. St. 147, and read theresult, in the language of the same court,
in a subsequent case. "We know," say the court, "the history of
these municipal and county bonds; how the legislature, yielding to
popular excitement about railroads, authorized their issue; how
grand jurors and county commissioners and city officers were
moulded to the purposes of speculators; how recklessly railroad
officers abused the overwrought confidence of the public, and what
burdens of debt and taxation have resulted to the people. A moneyed security was thrown upon the market by the paroxysm of the
public mind:" Diamond v. Lawrence Co., 37 Penn. St. 353. The
learned judges were quite too sanguine when they declared that the
like could never happen again; but we are not concerned with their
prophecy so much as we are with their manifcst consciousness that
those evils have come from a provision of the law. The best judgment of the legal profession, so far as I have been able to judge,
has always been against the lawfulness of this species of railroad
aid, and there has been a steady and persistent protest which no
popular clamor could silence against the decisions which supported
it. This protest has of late been growing stronger instead of fainter,
and if the recent decisions alone are regarded, the authority is
clearly with the protest. But whether this is so or not is not of
controlling authority here. We are embarrassed by no decisions
in this State, and are at liberty, therefore, to consider this question
on principle; and when the legal principle which should govern a
case stands out in bold relief, it is manifestly more in accord with
a proper discharge of judicial duty that we should reach to it
with directness, than that we should shut our eyes to the principle
and blindly follow where others have blindly led.
I have not deemed it important to consider any of the minor
objections to this act, preferring, as I do, to deal with the main aad
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fundamental infirmity. The case before us is that of a private corporation demanding a gratuity which has been voted to it in townAip meeting upon the assumption that its business operations and
facilities will incidentally benefit the township. I do not find that
the meeting possessed any inherent authority to pass such a vote
or that any such authority could have been conferred upon it. The
legislature could not confer upon the majority there convened a
jurisdiction to measure for the minority the demands upon their
gratitude or liberality. Individuals as such, must make their own
donations, and decide for themselves how far any proposed enterprise of other individuals can properly and justly, in view of the
benefits they may receive therefrom, demand their aid and assistance.
As, therefore, it appears that the first and most fundamental
maxim of taxation is violated by the act in question, it becomes superfluous to consider whether the act would also violate the maxim
of apportionment, or be obnoxious in its application, because the
burden, even if public, could not also be regarded as local and peculiar to this township. Equally superfluous is it to consider in
detail the several express provisions of the state constitution which
the respondents suppose to be violated. If the authority exercised
is not within the taxing power of the State, it is quite needless to
discuss whether, if it were within it, there are no restrictions
which prohibit its exercise.
The mandamus applied for should, in my opinion, be denied.
CAmPEELL, 0. J., and CHRISTLANCY, J., delivered concurring
opinions.
GLAvEs, J., dissented.
In the March number of the Register, for the present year (ante 156),
we published the opinion of the supreme Court of Wisconsin, delivered
by Chief Justice Dixoir, relating to
the same important subject discussed
and determined in the foregoing opinion.
That opinion was accompanied with
a brief reference to some of the more
recent decisions upon laws similar to
that which was under consideration
by the Wisconsin court.
The judgment of the Michigan
court has been anxiously awaited,
not only by the profession in that
State, but elsewhere; and wa cannot
refrain from making the observation
that there is one thing whioh will

please the profession and all good citi.
zens, even more than the conspicuous
ability and learning displayed by the
Judges, and that is the fact that they
have had the independence and cour.
age to make an unpopular decision.
We would honor them for it thougk
they were mistaken in theirJudgment.
Doubly would we honor them, believing their judgment to be sound. The
recent work of Judge Coorar on Con.
stitutional -.Aw, shows with what extensive research and great care he has
studied the general subject discussed
in his admirable opinion. This cir.
cumstance, so familiar to the. bench
and bar of the country, will increase
the influence, If It does not add to the
weight, of the decision of the court.
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It will be seen that the opinion of
Judge Cooirz (whichtheother judges,
except one, concurred in), rests upon
this ground, viz.: The statute in question professes to be an exercise by the
legislature of thetaxing power; no tax
can, it is argued, be imposed for a nere
private purpose,. or to aid mere private enterprises; the act in question
violatedtbis principle, and consequently was not authorized by the general
power of the legislature to provide for
the levy of taxes.
It is believed that all the cases agree
that a public use or purpose is essential to the idea ofa tax. Some of these
will be briefly referred to. "I concede," says BLAcK, C. J., in Sharpless
v. Mayor of Philadephia, 21 Pa. St.
167, "that a law authorizing taxation
for any other than public purposes is
void." Again he says: "A tax for a
private purpose is unconstitutional,
though it pass through the hands of
public officers." So Low, J., in the
Wapello Counly Case, 13 Iowa 405,
remarks that a tax for a private purpose is "a solecism in language." Tte
following definitions and opinions assert the same principle or idea:
"A tax is a portion of the property
of individuals which is taken from
them by the government, and disposed ofbyit:" 21 Ency. Britt. 37.
"Tax.-A rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of L
citizen, by government for the use of
the nation or State :" Webet. Diat.
"Taxes are contributions paid by
the inhabitants of a country for the
use of the government:" New Am.
Ency., vol. 15, p. 807.
"A tax is generally understoo I to
mean the imposition of a duty or impost for the support of government :"
Pray NYorth Lib.. 31 Pa. St. 69.
Taxes are burdens or charges ira-

posed by the legislature upon persons
or property to raise money for public
purposes: Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations, 479.
Again, Judge Coozxz remarks, Id.
487, "tazation having for its only le
gitimate object the raising of money
for public purposes and the proper
needs of government, the exaction of
money from the citizens for other purposes is not a proper exercise of the
power, and must therefore be unauthorized."
"A tax was anciently defined to
be a certain aid, subsidy or supply
granted by the Commons of Great
Britain and constituting the King's
revenue: 4 Inst. 216-233; as the name
imports, from its derivation, it means
tribute, and belonged to the King's
treasury. And I think the common
mind has everywhere taken in the"
understanding that taxes are a public
imposition, levied by authority of the
government, for the purpose of carrying on the government In all its machinery and operations; that they are
imposed for a public purpose." CouLTEn, J., in NQrth. Lib. v. St. John's
Church,13 Pa. 104, 107.
"Taxation is the mode of raising
money for public purposes or uses."
Matter of Mayor of ff. Y7. 11 John.
77, and authorities cited.
"A tax is an impost levied by authority of government, upon its citizens or subjects, for the support of the
State. It is not founded upon contract or agreement. It operates in
invitum." Per Chief Justice Gnzz;
Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutch. 398.
It being settled that taxation for
mere private purposes is invalid, is in
fact not taxation at all, but an illegal
exaction under that name, the foregoing is another decision in favor of
the principal that the mere incidental
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advantage accruing to the public from
the construction of a railway by a
private person or a private corporaton, 1 not such a public purpose as
will authorize the legislature to levy
a tax to aid in its construction.
The recent decisions seem all to be
in this direction, and it can scarcely
be doubted that the general and professional Judgment will sooner or later
assent to such sound and wholesome
doctrine. Private property must be
respected and kept inviolate. The
transcendent power to tax must be
kept within its legitimate bounds, or
else in these days of powerful combinations and monopolies, all security
for private property is undermined.
No man wishes to hold his property
at the will of a majority of the legislature, or the people of his ward, city,
township or county.
A statute of a similar character to
the Michigan law recently passed the
legislature of California, and upon the
strength of the reasoning of the Iowa
Supreme Court, in Hansen v. Vernon,
27 Iowa R., and of the Wisconsin Supreme Court inthe case above referred
to (ante 156), it was vetoed by the
Governor.
After the decision of the Iowa court
against the validity of he Act of
March 22, 18, the recent legislature
speculating upon the effect of certain
changes in the constitution of the Supreme Bench of the State, re-enacted
in substance the same law which the
court, bad, with only one dissenting
voice, pronounced unconstitutional.

The subject of taxing localities to
aid in building railroads therein, attracted great attentionfromtherecent
Illinois Constitutional Convention.
After much debate the following
proposition to prohibit municipal aid
to private railway corporations was
submitted to a separate vote of the
people:
"No county, city, town, township,
or other municipality, shall ever become subscriber to the capital stock of
any railroad or private corporation,
or make donation to, or loan its credit
in aidof such corporation: Provided,
however, that the adoption of this articleshall not be construed as affecting
the right of any such municipality to
make such subscriptions where the
same have been authorized, under ex-.
isting laws, by a vote of the people of
such municipalities prior to such adoption."
This clause was adopted by the people at the election held on July 2, by a
large majority. Henceforth in Illinois by an organic provision, wise in
conception, and which will prove salutary in operation, municipalities will
be confined to their proper and legitimate objects and aids and donatonsby
public bodies, at the public expense,
to private corporations, will cease.
Henceforth, in that great State the
rights of the citizens and of private
property will be respected, and there
will be no more illegal exactions from
the people under the guise of taxation,
and under the professed exercise of
It is not believed by the profession the taxing power, at the dictation and
that the decision in Hansen v. Vernon, for the benefit of private corporations.
Nothing but the bitter fruits of the
which accords with the oft-reiterated
opposite policy brought about the
and well-known doctrine of that court
adoption into the new Constitution o
on the subject of municipal aid to
the State, the prohibition above men.
railways, will be overthrown, and the
tioned.
State plunged into all the evils and
J. F. D.
odium arising from shifting and uncertain decisions.
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It will not give much increased
weight to the foregoing opinion for us
to add our testimony in its behalf. In
an early edition of our work on the law
of railways we stated our inability
to comprehend the basis upon which
the numerous decisions m favor of
the legality of such subscriptions are
made to rest. And we cannot fairly
say that our opinions in regard to the
question have suffered any material
change in the intervening period.
Some persons may be simple enough
perhaps
to believe, and more wil
affect to believe, that the decision of
the Supreme Court of Michigan
against the validity of these subscriptions, will be likely to affect the prosperity of the State unfavorably. That
consideration is one not entitled to
any weight whatever in a judicial
point of view. The courts cannot
justify taking one man's property for
the use of another, merely because it
might prove useful in a general point
of view. But public criticism is likely
to sieze hold of any such argument,
where it can be made available. And
we notice already that the public
press, in one instance, in a kind of
paroxysm of affected virtue and holy
indignation, begin to call upon the
Governor to assemble the legislature
for the purpose ofabolishing the court.
The people, or the legislature, or the
Governor of that State, will not be
likely either to ask or to follow any
advice of ours, and we do not purpose
to be at any expense in that direction.
But we cannot but remember that the
State of Michigan has in former years
maintained a very high character for
the purity and ability of its judicial
administration, and if those who have
an interest in, or who feel a pride
upon that subject, as who does not,
will be at the pains to inquire what

gives that unimportant commercial
State its highest glory both at home
and abroad, they will probably learn
that it depends far more upon the
character of their judiciary than upon
the extent of their railways, and ir
they are looking forward to long years
of the continuance of their present
high distinction, we might almost say
renown, they will probably take the
second sober thought before they presume to lay any very destructive hand
upon their present judiciary. The
truth is, that threats of this kind are
becoming quite too common for the
credit-of the country.- A court may
err, must err, sometimes, as the Su.
preme Court of the United States probably did in regard to the validity of
the Act of Congress creating legal tenders, as applicable to existing obligations. But who does not rejoice that
the supreme judicial tribunal of the
nation possessed dignity and self-respect sufficient not to allow its solemn
decisions to be disturbed by any re.
modeling of the court or addition to
its members. And it was exceedingly
creditable to the new members so
gracefully to acquiesce in that result
as well as to the other members of the
court who had dissented from the decision.
The truth is, if we would have free
government, anything but a bear
garden for constant conflicts, we
must learn to acquiesce in the decisions of the courts of last resort, and
to feel that it is right and best that it
should be as it is. There is no just
certainty of absolute truth in anything,
depending upon mere argument, and
reason. There will always be more
or less conflict of opinionupon all such
questions, and interest will be likely,
in the end, to carry the day, as it
seems to us that It has in most of the
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States upon the subject discussed It n agement, mustrevolutionize
the entire
the foregoing opinions. There has business of the world. But the railbeen a 6ertam amount of infatuatior ways in this country are at present,
upon the subject of railways from thee we must think, rather exceptionably
very rst adoption of them for traveI mismanaged, if we may be allowed to
and transportation. The change thus use a term which, in this connection,
wrought has been so wonderful that possesses peculiar force and signifimen could not stop to reflect whethei cance. These short lines of railways,*
the thing would be useful when car- of twenty, or fty, or a hundred miles,
ried Into every little bye-town in the in almost all the States, kept under
country or not. We do not like to separate management in order, it
think that we live in a bye-place, out would seem, to make more places for
of sight of great commercial empori- the idle, the dissolute or the incompe.
ums. And we naturally rush head- tent, must be combined into through
long into anything which promises to lines of long travel and traffc where
level down all the accidental advan- that can be done; and those wnch
tages of large commercial cities. And cannot be brought into long through
under this spirit of infatuation thou- lines must be brought under the man.
sauds of the most absurd railway en- agement and control of such through
terprises have been set on foot. All lines as feeders, by means of the local
this is well enough, and no one need or way business; and the whole, thus
complain so long as they are fostered combined into one interest, must, in
and maintained by those who believe order either to serve the public interin their utility. That may be the only est or become remunerative, be brought
mode of curing the delusion. But that under one management also. This is
affords no reason why those who do the only flexable mode in which railnot believe in their utility or practi- way traffic can be made safe or pro.
ability.' should be compelled to con- ductive, and to our apprehension the
tribute to their support through the only mode by which it can be main.
convenient shield of taxation.
tained in responsible and honest
The very fact that a railway project hands.
requires the aid of compulsory sup- And to effect all this there must be
port by means of taxation, shows wrought some mightyand magnificent
clearly enough that it cannot be self- reform or revolution, and this must
supporting; and, as a general thing, be done by governmental control,
railways, which cannot be made self- througli the courts, in carrying into
supporting had better not be built. effect legislative restrictions and regu.
The railway enterprise, as it is some- lations. How this is to be effected is
times called, is but just in its infancy one of the greatest problems of the
at the present time. The best in- day or the era, and one that will
formed and the most experienced have crowd the present race of time-serving
yet much to learn In regard to it, and political speculators from their places,
the mass of the people know just no- and sooner or later bring in a class
of
thing on the subject, or nothing as men capable of comprehending
and
I hey ought to know. There is little dealing with
these great interests and
question that railways, when properly dealing with them as they deserve.
constructed and under proper man- When that great day shall finally
Vot. XVIIL-
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dawn, either through the entire ruin
and overthrow of the present limited
management of railways, or by gradual consolidation of every interest, it
will be impossible to conjecture with
any certainty how the mighty machinery will finally be controlled. It
lias always seemed to us that it must
eventually fall under the control of
the national government. Railways
are essentially a national interest.
The two most important interests subserved by them, the post-office and
military movements, are exclusively
national, and travel and transportation from one end of the continent to
the other cannot 'be regarded as in
any just sense a State interest,, or a
matter which could properly be left
under the supervision of State legislation or State courts.
But however that may be, one thing
is certain, that these fragmentary lines
of railway, which are now being very
extensively fostered and maintained
by means of municipal taxation, must
aU be ultimately abandoned. They
will prove, in the end, mere burdens
and ineumbrances. One might as well
expect to build great commercial cities
at a distance from the ocean and the
great navigable lakes and rivers, as
to build up mere boroughs and villages into business centers by means
of railways. Unless there is some
natural export to feed them they will
die, and if there is, there will be no
need of legislation either to build or
maintain them. The project is therefore an unsound one, and one where
the public interest is materially subserved by having the supplies cut off
in any lawful manner. Not many
years hence, every one will feel that
the State of Michigan has escaped
a great calamity by having this reck-

less mode of taxation declared void
thus early Inits development.
We have said nothing in regard to
the character of the decision. We do
not suppose we could add anything to
what we have always said upon the
subject, and what has so often been
much better saidby the many eminent
jurists in the country, who have constantly maintained the doctrine of the
opinion in the present case. It seems
to us the court have presented it in-a
very plain and dignified and most unexceptionable form, and one not easy
to reply to by any fair argument.
The great fallacy or delusion in all
the opposite decisions seems to have
arisen from treating railways as publie interests, because the right of eminent domain attaches to them. But
that attaches, by act of the legislature, to all intercommunication, both
by land and by water. Turnpikes
and ferries have this right with their
grants and so long as they are owned
by the State or nation they may be
maintained by public taxation. The
same is true of all navigation; it carries with it the right of eminent domain. But no man thinks of main.
taining turnpikes and ferries and lines
of steamboats by means of public taxtion. No doubt government might
do that if they deemed it expedient,
but it must own them to do so. And
if it grants to private persons the exclusive right to own and operate these
public works, and to take the profits
arising from tolls conceded with the
grant, it certainly seems unreasonable
to allow the towns and cities, by majority votes, to tax property or to create mortgages upon it for the purpose
of fostering these purely private en
terprises. It certainly Is nothing less
than compelling one to subscribe to

